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Abstract
We explore the determinants and effects of trust relationships between up-
stream suppliers and downstream producers. Using unique survey data on individ-
ual supplier-buyer relationships in the German automotive industry, we show, by
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1 Introduction
Trust is a key ingredient of social life. We teach children to trust each other and we all
understand that in a world where social relations are governed by trust, life is simpler
and more pleasant. However, when we study social interactions as economists, we tend
to focus almost exclusively on selfish motives. In recent years, however, sociologists and
economists has started paying attention to social interactions based on trust and fairness
and the cooperative behavior induced by them.1 The implications of these concepts of
trust substantively go beyond cooperation enforced by punishment threats in infinitely
repeated interactions and are at the core of the theory of relational contracts.2
In these models, trust induces informal contracts that may efficiently replace legally
enforced ones. In particular, if an agent trusts that he is being treated fairly by his
trading partner, an efficient amount of relationship specific investment will be fostered.
This is one of the general conclusions drawn from the literature on relational contracting,
which we want to bring to a test. To be able to do this we need the object of trust, as
recorded in the evidence, to be an individual, or a specific institution.
By contrast, most of the survey evidence on trust used to analyze its social impli-
cations, focuses on groups or large populations as the objects of trust. In particular,
in the World View Survey, on which most of the empirical literature on the subject is
based, respondents are asked to evaluate their trust in the population of a country. Their
responses are used to analyze aggregate consequences on financial and goods markets.
To the best of our knowledge, there is very little if any empirical evidence on trust
towards individuals or institutions, and its impacts on these individuals’ or firms’ be-
havior. The present paper tries to fill this gap by evaluating how trust impacts the
design, production and exchange of complex products, namely the blueprints result-
ing from innovative investments by first tier upstream suppliers into the production of
automobiles.
Upstream buyer-supplier relationships in automobile production are an extraordi-
narily good field in which to conduct such a study, for several reasons. The supply of
a product is preceded by substantive research and development, that is at the same
time buyer un-specific and buyer specific.3 The resulting intermediate product, or part,
1In Section 2 below we briefly discuss the existing literature.
2See Gibbons (2011) for a detailed account of relational contracts from an economist’s perspective.
3In contrast to the US and Japan, in the Central European car manufacturing industry, upstream
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however, almost always exhibits buyer-specific features, and is characterized by a par-
ticularly high level of complexity. The final product, the automobile, exhibits strict
complementarities between all contributing parts. In all, efficiency considerations neces-
sitate the early and lasting co-operation between the agents involved in the design and
the production of all the parts of an automobile. This however is usually associated with
a superior market power on the part of the car manufacturers vis-a`-vis their suppliers.
In other words, there is a clear tradeoff between attaining the desired quality levels and
the manufacturers’ short-term incentives to extract suppliers’ rents.
The data set we are basing our analysis on is a vast survey of the German car
manufacturing industry conducted under the auspices of the German Automotive In-
dustry Association (VDA).4 Within this data set we explore the object of the contract
(relational or explicit) between the car manufacturers and the suppliers, the contract-
ing environment, and both contracting partners’ evaluations of their relationship. In
particular, we do have survey evidence of the suppliers’ perception of the contracting
relationship with the automotive producers they develop and produce for, as well as the
corresponding evidence of the car manufacturers’ perception of the same relationship.
When doing this we are able to distinguish among individual products taken from one of
four categories differentiated by complexity. The contracting relationship is then docu-
mented in all development and production phases. In particular, the suppliers involved
in the survey were asked about their contracting relationship by product development
and production phase, product, and car manufacturer.
In order to organize our empirical analysis, we first develop a theoretical model of the
procurement relationship. We extract two predictions from it. First, not surprisingly,
higher levels of trust lead to higher relationship specific investments. Second, more
surprisingly, an increase in trust is associated with more competition in the procurement
process. The reason is that competition can be a substitute for other forms of rent
extraction on the part of the car manufacturer. Stronger competition induced by the
manufacturer is then associated with higher levels of suppliers’ trust.
More specifically, we define an upstream supplier’s trust in the downstream buyer as
his belief that the buyer would not exploit his bargaining power in the hold-up situation,
by extracting rents. This definition strikes us as closer to the sociological and colloquial
suppliers are responsible for much of the ground-breaking basic research, which is then adapted to the
specific needs of individual car models.
4Verband Deutscher Automobilunternehmen e.V.
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reading of the term “trust”. In particular, A trusts B to do something (or refrain
from doing something) which is in B’s realm of influence, if no explicit legal constraints
require B to behave in this way. The measures of trust that we generate are relationship-
specific instead of subject specific. We analyze the determinants of suppliers’ trust in
the manufacturer using their reported past behavior.
We provide hard evidence in support of the prediction that higher levels of suppliers’
trust lead to higher relationship-specific investment, proxied here by the quality, namely
lower failure-rates, of the specific product supplied. While this is congruent with predic-
tions from many theoretical models, it is, to the best of our knowledge, the first empirical
test of this prediction.
More surprisingly, we show that, as opposed to the extant literature on relational
contracting, trust and competition between upstream suppliers and the downstream
firm are not necessarily mutually exclusive. The prediction of our model is confirmed
by our empirical test: More intense suppliers’ competition, as induced by the buyer’s
procurement scheme, is associated with higher suppliers’ trust in the downstream firm.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. After briefly outlining the related
theoretical and empirical literature in Section 2, we develop, in Section 3, a simple model.
We are thus able to derive two hypotheses on the effects of trust on vertical relationships.
In Section 4, we first introduce the survey on which our empirical analysis is based.
We then present potential measures of trust and evaluate what they capture. Section
5 develops our empirical analysis. It analyses how trust between manufacturers and
suppliers is related to the two central questions, namely suppliers’ (under-)investment
and sourcing decisions. Section 6 concludes.
2 Literature Review
2.1 Theoretical Literature
A business relationship that does not resort to legal means of enforcement would in
colloquial terms be interpreted as based on ”trust”. In this sense, trust is the basis for
relational contracts. There is a rich theory on relational contracting in different con-
texts, beginning with Bull (1987) who provides the original repeated games-framework
to analyze employment relationships. As far as employment contracts are concerned,
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Baker, Gibbons, and Murphy (1994) demonstrate how the combination of formal and
relational contracts can lead to better results than either instrument could achieve alone.
Interestingly, formal and relational contracts can be substitutes (if either works almost
perfectly) or complements.5
More recently, research has focused on more general settings, searching for optimal
contract design. Levin (2003) finds that while under moral hazard optimal relational
contracts exist and are relatively simple, under hidden information cases arise in which
agents do not respond at all to the incentives provided therein. Calzolari and Spagnolo
(2009) further extend this case. While in their model the relationship between a princi-
pal repeatedly interacting with an agent can suffer from both moral hazard and hidden
information, they allow the principal to screen, and select from competing, but poten-
tially colluding agents. In situations in which non-contractible factors contribute more
to the principal’s payoff, they find the intuitively appealing result that the principal will
rely more heavily on relational contracts with a smaller set of agents. By contrast, in
”simpler” settings in which the most important issues are contractible, the principal will
rely more on competition among agents.
Brown, Falk, and Fehr (2004) carry out an experimental study focussing on the effects
of the enforceability of contracts. Much in line with the theoretical results described
above, they find that as enforcement becomes more effective, the original long-term
rent-sharing relationships are replaced by short-term arms-length agreements. In their
specific setting, this can be taken as evidence that formal and relational contracts are
substitutes.
The models described above have in common that relational contracts and competi-
tion are polar concepts—you either rely on handshakes or you prefer arms-length market
interactions. By contrast, we show in our analytical model, as well as the empirical anal-
ysis, that trust and competition can actually be complements in a hold-up setting, if
competition is used as a mechanism of extracting rent from one of several individuals,
instead of resorting to extracting rents from the same individual through superior bar-
gaining power. As the concept of trust that we propose is not fully congruent with
relational contracts, our result can be seen as complementing this literature.
5See Gibbons (2011) and MacLeod (2007) surveys on the topic. In the latter survey the effects of
legal systems of different quality are specifically addressed.
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2.2 Empirical Literature
Trust has for some time drawn considerable attention and scrutiny from experimental
and empirical economists.6 Yet some of the more experimental literature has been
rather cautious about using this term, even actively trying to avoid it (see for example
the discussion in MacLeod (2007)).7 By contrast, empirical researchers have been less
shy in this regard, so that some empirical analyses of trust do exist.
The basis for many empirical studies on trust is the World Values survey, and in
it, the set of answers to the question: “Generally speaking, would you say that most
people can be trusted, or that you have to be very careful in dealing with people?” While
one may doubt the power of this construct at first glance,8 it has been used frequently
in a number of studies. The basic hypothesis of La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer,
and Vishny (1997) is that trust is an integral requirement for the functioning of large
organizations in which the likelihood of repeated interactions is relatively small, and
thus the established mechanisms for ensuring cooperative behavior are less effective. In
a cross-country study they establish that populations with higher levels of trust should
foster more effective governance as well as relatively larger firms. Aghion, Algan, Cahuc,
and Shleifer (2008) perform an international comparison on the nexus between levels of
social capital (or trust/distrust), and the demand for (or the amount available) of state
regulation. The intuition is that a lack of civic mindedness in one’s fellow citizens
may lead to a stronger desire for the state to regulate interactions. They find very
strong evidence for this, even for societies in which the government itself is plagued by
corruption. It therefore appears that trust and regulation are to some extent substitutes.
Guiso, Sapienza, and Zingales (2009) focus on the trust citizens of a given country in
Europe have toward citizens of another country. Here the levels of trust are explained in
part by the geographic distance between countries, but also by sociological and genetic
closeness and common history. Less trust in the citizens of a country is associated
with significantly lower aggregate trade and investment. In an another study, Guiso,
Sapienza, and Zingales (2004) suggest that the different characteristics of Italian regions
lead their citizens to develop different levels of social capital. They then show that
6See Fehr (2009) for an overview of the experimental and neuro-economic literature on trust.
7For a careful survey of the development of the term ”culture” in economics, and the effects of
culture on economic outcomes, see Guiso, Sapienza, and Zingales (2006).
8See Sapienza, Toldra, and Zingales (2007) for an experimental study on the merits of this measure
and a discussion of the previous literature.
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in high social capital/trust areas people are more prone to invest in stocks instead of
holding cash reserves, and have easier access to bank credit. The effect is mitigated
by levels of education. Along similar lines, Guiso, Sapienza, and Zingales (2005) find
that individuals who display higher levels of trust buy more risky assets relative to their
wealth. They counter the natural question that this might be due to differences in risk
attitudes by controlling for risk- and ambiguity-aversion. Their original result persists.
In contrast to the research mentioned so far, Butler, Giuliano, and Guiso (2009)
study the effects of individuals’ trust as opposed to trust towards groups. They use
the European Social Survey as well as experimental evidence to argue that a medium
amount of trust may be optimal for individuals. Too little trust may lead individuals
to miss too many opportunities for beneficial interactions, while too much trust leads to
the danger of being taken advantage of.
Finally, Bottazzi, Da Rin, and Hellmann (2009) study the willingness of venture
capitalists to perform non-contractible services in a micro-economic environment. In
particular, they analyze the influence of more effective legal systems in this context.
Both in their theoretical model and their empirical analysis of a data-set on European
venture-capital deals they find that a more efficient legal system has the following two
effects. On the one hand, it is complementary to trust, in the sense that it makes venture
capitalists more willing to grant non-contractible support. On the other hand, it leads
venture capitalists to require more protection for the case of failure of the venture.9
Our empirical analysis adds a new angle to the way economists think about trust. We
define trust not as a characteristic specific to individuals. Instead, we interpret trust as
the expectation of one party towards future behavior of the other, based on relationship-
specific observable and unobservable characteristics, including the joint history. Based
on this approach, we analyze how higher or lower levels of a supplier’s trust in a buyer
affect upstream investment levels, as well as the choice of contractual setting in the
German automobile industry.
9In the working paper on the same data, Bottazzi, Da Rin, and Hellmann (2007) also show that
higher scores on the Euro-Barometer measure of trust between nations are associated with higher cross-
country investments.
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3 Analytical Framework
We introduce in this section a simple model, with two main goals in mind: Clearly define
the concept of trust that we wish to work with, and derive robust predictions that we
can bring to the data and test.
In line with our observations on upstream procurement, we focus on how compe-
tition between suppliers — as induced by the original equipment manufacturer (OEM
hereafter) — relates to issues of under-investment due to hold-up problems. What we
observe in reality when a new part is to be developed and procured is that in many
cases several suppliers are invited to develop a blueprint that is supposed to match the
OEM’s specifications. Depending on the development stage, these can range from ex-
tremely vague (pre-development up to 3 years in advance of series production) to rather
specific (detailed development about 6-9 months prior to series production). A large
part of the compensation to the supplier for the development effort is comprised in the
OEM’s subsequent business regarding series production or more detailed development—
but in these later phases only a subset (often only one firm) of the previously employed
suppliers will be awarded the second contract.
3.1 Structure and Timing of the Procurement Game
Consider a monopolistic OEM who needs the input of one supplier towards producing
output of value v(θi, Ii), where θi designates the intrinsic quality and Ii the effort choice
of supplier i to be defined exactly below.
At t = 0, the OEM irreversibly chooses, from a large pool consisting of ex-ante iden-
tical potential suppliers, n of them and invites them to develop and submit a blueprint
for the part it wants to procure. The OEM incurs a cost k of selecting an additional
supplier in the development stage, so that the total costs associated with the devel-
opment phase are nk.10 Each supplier i selected by the OEM independently draws an
intrinsic quality parameter θi from the publicly known continuous distribution Q(θ) with
domain [0, 1]. There are many ways to interpret this parameter — for example it could
10The cost k could be interpreted as the setup investment the OEM has to make with the supplier
in order for the latter to develop a blueprint compatible with the model in the OEM production line.
Alternatively, this could be repayment of costs that the OEM owes to each supplier involved in the
development stage. In either case, for simplicity we take this cost to be independent of the supplier’s
investment.
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be regarded as a measure of how well the supplier’s employees involved in the project
are compatible with the OEM’s engineers, or how well the research capacities of the
two firms complement each other with regard to the period of time in question. Clearly
there is a certain level of randomness involved here, even if the firms have cooperated
in the past. In an established industry, like the automotive industry, this randomness
should be similar across comparable suppliers. At any rate, after each supplier privately
observes the value of θi, he chooses an investment level Ii. This investment comes at a
cost described by the function c(Ii) common to all suppliers, with both c
′ and c′′ strictly
positive.
At t = 1, the suppliers’ qualities and investment choices become common knowledge.
Only one of the suppliers receives a second contract. He is selected in the following way.
If n = 1, then this supplier is awarded the contract. Otherwise, the suppliers engage in
Bertrand competition under perfectly symmetric information. Supplier i proposes a bid
bi, and the supplier with the highest bid is awarded the contract.
Finally, at t = 2, the supplier that submitted the winning bid; and the OEM bargain
over how to share the joint surplus from production v(θi, Ii), which is strictly increasing
and concave in both θi and Ii. In this bargaining process, we denote by g the OEM’s
exogenously given outside option. The supplier’s outside option is instead endogenously
determined by his effort choice and is an exogenously given share σ ∈ (0, 1) of the surplus
from production, σv(θi, Ii). In other words, the surplus generated by the supplier’s
investment within the relationship is strictly greater than the surplus obtained from that
investment outside the relationship. Moreover, the marginal return from the investment
is also higher within the relationship than outside it.
The first best investment level I∗ is determined by the first order condition
∂v(θ, I∗)
∂I
= c′(I∗) (1)
where I∗(θ) denotes the first best level of investment for the supplier of type θ. Any
level of investment below I∗(θ) represents under-investment.
In what follows we analyze two polar configurations of the bargaining power in the
negotiation at t = 2. We first consider the case in which the OEM has full bargaining
power (case FBO). We then consider the case in which the supplier has full bargaining
power and makes a take-it-or-leave-it offer to the OEM (case FBS ). One possible inter-
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pretation of these cases is that the supplier owns the property rights of the blueprints
developed at t = 1. In the FBO case the OEM expropriates the supplier of these prop-
erty rights without any fear of repercussions, while in the FBS case the OEM honors
these property rights.
3.2 Results
We here solve for the Subgame Perfect equilibrium (SPE) of our model distinguishing
between the two cases described above.11
We start from the FBO case where the whole bargaining power resides with the
OEM.
At t = 2, the OEM offers the winning supplier i the fixed payment T maximizing
v(θi, Ii) − T , subject to the supplier’s participation constraint, so that T ≥ σv(θi, Ii).
The SPE of the bargaining subgame is such that the OEM offers exactly T = σv(θi, Ii),
and the supplier accepts.
We now move backward to period t = 1 and the Bertrand competition game among
suppliers. We just have seen that the supplier awarded the second period contract will
obtain an offer equivalent to his outside option, so that he is indifferent between winning
and losing the bid.12 Nevertheless, the expected valuation v increases in n: As suppli-
ers are indifferent, and there is symmetric information at this point, the OEM is able
to select the highest-quality supplier out of n. Mathematically, this is a simple order
statistic problem. The maximum order statistic with n draws follows the distribution
Qn1 (θ) = [Q(θ)]
n. For a non-degenerate Q, [Q(θ)]n+1 stochastically dominates [Q(θ)]n.
The corresponding expectation is therefore increasing in the number of suppliers n, lead-
ing to a higher expected quality θi of the highest quality supplier among the competitors,
without affecting their investment incentives.
We can now move backward to t = 0 and the supplier’s investment choice. This
11When solving backward the model we restrict attention to the set of cautious equilibria of the
Bertrand competition game. The basic idea behind this equilibrium concept is that no supplier should be
willing to make a bid that would leave the supplier in the case he wins worse off relative to the equilibrium
if he refused to participate in the Bertrand game. The dynamic version of the same equilibrium notion
has been used in the analysis of Bergemann and Va¨lima¨ki (1996) and Felli and Harris (1996). In our
static environment a cautious equilibrium is equivalent to an equilibrium in weakly dominant strategies.
12The winning bidder receives his outside option as the outcome of t = 2 bargaining, the losing
suppliers receive it because they have to fall back on it.
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supplier faces the following maximization problem:
max
I
σv(θi, I)− c(I)
with first order condition
σ
∂v(θi, I
FBO
i )
∂I
= c′(IFBOi )) (2)
where IFBOi denotes the supplier’s optimal investment level as a function of θi . In this
setting therefore the typical supplier under-invests, so IFBOi := I
FBO(θi) < I
∗(θi). The
ex ante expected profit of the OEM is
EΠFBOO = (1− σ)E[v(θ1, I
FBO(θ1))|n]− nk, (3)
associated with the expected quality and investment of the highest quality supplier
denoted θ1. The OEM benefits from larger n only through the higher expected quality
of the best supplier and extracts the entire value. The optimal nFBO is then chosen
so that the marginal benefits from the expected profit gains is just below the costs for
nFBO + 1.
Consider, now, the FBS case where the whole bargaining power resides with the
supplier.
Focus first on the case n = 1, in which a single supplier has been chosen at t = 0. At
t = 2, the unique SPE of the bargaining subgame is for the supplier to offer the outside
option, g, to the OEM. This outside option does not depend upon the effort provided
by the chosen supplier.13 In period t = 0, the supplier’s maximization problem is
max
I
v(θi, Ii)− g − c(Ii)
leading to the first order condition
∂v(θ, I∗)
∂I
= c′(I∗)
Obviously, this contract induces first best effort choice I∗(θ) by the supplier, who in this
case absorbs all rents of the project.
13The results from contacting another supplier do not directly depend on the effort the first supplier
has provided.
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The case in which suppliers compete at t = 1 differs substantially. Consider first the
bargaining subgame at t = 2 between the OEM and the supplier that prevailed in the
Bertrand competition game, with the winning bid denoted b1. We will see that in equi-
librium this bid coincides with the OEM’s endogenous outside option. The next question
is then how high will the suppliers be willing to bid? Ignoring the investment costs that
are sunk at this stage, the winner i’s payoff is the total surplus of the project minus his
bid, that is v(θi, I(θi)) − bi, while the losing bidders j still obtain their outside option
worth σv(θj, I(θj)). The suppliers derive higher rents from winning the competition, as
long as their bid is smaller than bˆi := (1− σ)v(θi, I(θi)).
At t = 1, the suppliers compete a` la Bertrand. As mentioned above, at this
stage, the individual qualities and investment levels are common knowledge.14 The
cautious equilibrium of the Bertrand game is for the most efficient supplier i, with
i = argmaxi≤n v(θi, I(θi)), to win by submitting an offer to the OEM, that coincides
with the one submitted by the second most efficient supplier and that makes the latter
indifferent between being selected or not.15 In other words, if we denote the most effi-
cient supplier as supplier 1 and the second most efficient supplier as 2, the equilibrium
bids are b1 = b2 = (1− σ)v(θ2, I(θ2)).
To understand the economic mechanisms at play here, it is helpful to consider the
OEM’s payoffs at given levels of investment and given the choice of suppliers n. Denote
the most efficient supplier as supplier 1 and the second most efficient supplier as 2.
The OEM’s payoff for given investments is simply (1 − σ)v(θ2, I(θ2)) − nk, which is
equivalent to the surplus the second most efficient supplier would receive if running
the project, minus the OEM’s costs of soliciting the n offers. Ignoring the investment
incentives for the moment, two effects are at play. As for the first effect: just as in the
FBO case the expected quality of the second best supplier improves when increasing n
– though because of Bertrand competition it follows the second instead of the highest
order statistic distribution. This is a level effect. The OEM profits from the overall
expected quality increase. To understand the second effect it is useful to first derive the
surplus of the most efficient supplier net of his outside option (ignoring the sunk effort
costs incurred in the previous period):
14This assumption is not necessary in this setting, as bidding their real valuations is a weakly dominant
strategy in the second price auction where bidders have private information on θi.
15We obtain the same outcome with a second price auction – here each supplier bids her valuation
and the most efficient one pays the second most efficient supplier’s bid.
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(1− σ)[v(θ1, I(θ1))− v(θ2, I(θ2))] (4)
While in the FBO case the OEM uses his bargaining power to absorb the entire
surplus from cooperation no matter how many suppliers compete, now the most efficient
supplier captures a share of this surplus, determined by the difference in surplus between
his and the second best design. As n becomes larger this difference shrinks, so that the
OEM receives a greater share of the surplus. This is the second effect mentioned above.
Now we turn to the suppliers’ investment decision at t = 0. First consider the
expected payoff of the supplier that is eventually awarded the production contract,
conditional on the number of suppliers involved in the competition and the realization
of his own quality θi. This is
E[(v(θ1, I(θ1))− (1− σ)v(θ2, I(θ2))|n, θ1 = θi]− c(Ii)) (5)
or
v(θ1, I(θ1))− (1− σ)E[v(θ2, I(θ2))|n, θ1 = θi]− c(Ii)). (6)
Hence the payoff of the supplier receiving the production contract is the value pro-
duced minus his investment costs and the expected surplus generated by the second
best supplier. Denote the latter term ν(θ2, I(θ2), n). This term is independent of the
suppliers’ investment I(θ1) and increases in the number of suppliers involved for given
levels of investment. Clearly, supplier i does not receive this payoff with certainty,
but instead he anticipates that he will be awarded the subsequent contract only if he
is the most efficient supplier. Since at this point the intrinsic quality of the other
suppliers is unknown, the supplier expects this event to take place with probability
p(θi, Ii, n) = p{v(θi, Ii) ≥ supj 6=i v(θj, Ij)}.
The supplier i’s maximization problem at t = 0 is then:
max
Ii
p(θi, Ii, n)
[
v(θi, Ii)−max
j 6=i
ν(θj, I(θj), n)
]
+ [1− p(θi, Ii, n)]σv(θi, Ii) − c(Ii)
(7)
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This leads to the first order condition with respect to optimal investment:
c′(Ii) =
∂p(θi, Ii, n)
∂Ii
[
(1− σ)v(θi, Ii)−max
j 6=i
ν(θj, I(θj), n)
]
+ [(1− σ)p(θi, Ii, n) + σ]
∂(v(θi, Ii)
∂Ii
(8)
We observe a number of countervailing effects. On the one hand, investment in-
centives are somewhat diluted, as the supplier only profits from the added value with
positive probability less than unity (unless n = 1). On the other hand, by choosing
higher levels of investment he can increase the probability that the contract will be
awarded to him. Notice that, irrespective of the number of suppliers n, the investment
incentives are strictly higher in the present FBS case than in the FBO case: while in
the latter, the suppliers never get any share of the surplus they generate within the
relationship in excess of their outside option, they get in the former case some of that
surplus in expectation, even if incentives are diluted by competition. In other words,
suppliers undertake higher effort in the FBS case. Only as n gets very large, the effort
levels converge to the levels in the former case.
Denote the supplier i’s investment choice in the FBS case by IFBS(θi), and the
most and second most efficient suppliers as supplier 1 and supplier 2, respectively, the
expected profits of the OEM in this case are
EΠFBSO = (1− σ)E[v(θ2, I
FBS(θ2, n))|n]− nk. (9)
At first blush, equations (3) and (9) may be interpreted as the OEM’s profits are
necessarily higher in the FBO case, as one is comparing the first with the second order
statistic. But unlike the FBO case, in which the supplier’s investment level was not
affected by the choice of n, here the supplier’s investment choice does depend on the
level of competition and is, at the same time, strictly larger than above. As a result, we
cannot in general rank the two profit levels.
This is the key tradeoff. In the short run (for given suppliers’ investments) the
expropriation of the supplier leads to higher profits for the OEM. However, in the long
run, when the suppliers’ investments adjust to the new situation this dominance is not
necessarily true. In Section 3.3.1 below we reinterpret this tradeoff in terms of trust and
competition.
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We consider now the OEM choice of the optimal number of suppliers in the two
cases. In the FBO case, the only effect of increasing n is that the expected quality of
the best supplier increases. In the FBS case, instead, three different effects are in play.
First, as in the FBO case, the higher n, the higher the expected quality of supplier —
although here only the quality of the second most efficient supplier matters. Second, the
higher n, the higher is the share of the surplus absorbed by the OEM. Third, a higher
n decreases each supplier’s chance of being the winner of the production contract and
hence decreases the typical supplier’s incentive to invest. It is clear that if the first two
effects are the dominant ones the overall effect of an increase in n is greater in the FBS
as opposed to the FBO case. In other words, the OEM would choose a higher n in
the FBS case, were it not for the investment effect. Indeed, when n → ∞, the second
order statistic approaches the first order statistic from below. As both are monotonic
increasing, the slope of the second order statistic must be strictly greater. As a result,
the OEM will choose a higher n in the FBS case than in the FBO one. This is true
unless the investment-deterring effect of increasing n is “large” relative to the other two
effects.
Consider a parameterized example illustrating this result. Let supplier quality be
uniformly distributed so that Q(θ) = θ, the typical supplier’s investment cost function
be c(I) = I2/2, the surplus derived from cooperation be v(θ, I) = θI, and the OEM’s
outside option be g = 0. The closed-form solutions to this example are summarized in
the following table:
I(θ) E(v) EΠO
FBO: n = 1 σθ σ
3
σ(1−σ)
3
− k
FBO: n > 1 σθ σn
n+2
σ(1−σ)n
n+2
− nk
FBS: n = 1 θ 1
3
−k
FBS: n > 1 (1− σ)θn + σθ (1−σ)n
2n+1
+ σn
n+2
σ(1−σ)n(n−1)
(n+1)(n+2)
+ (n−1)(1−σ)
2
2(2n+1)
− nk
Table 1: Parameterized Example (Q(θ) = θ, c(I) = I2/2, v(θ, I) = θI).
In the FBS case, the suppliers’ investment is higher by (1 − σ)θn than in the FBO
case. When n increases, investment incentives decrease, but due to the functional form,
as θ → 1, this effect becomes progressively smaller. In other words, the “wedge” in the
expected value of v between the FBO and the FBS cases is strictly positive even as the
number of suppliers increases unboundedly.
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Figure 1: OEM’s expected profits depending on n (Blue: ΠFBOO (low k); red: Π
FBO
O (high
k); green: ΠFBSO (low k); brown: Π
FBS
O (high k)).
As for the optimal choice of n, we can compare the expected profits in the third
column of Table 1. First, compare only the first terms of EΠFBOO and EΠ
FBS
O . The
term in the FBS case starts out at 0 and approaches the level of the first term in the
FBO case as n → ∞. As discussed above, this isolates the effect of the second order
statistic approaching the first order one for given investment levels. The second term of
EΠFBSO is also strictly increasing in n, which reflects the higher share of the (larger) total
surplus being captured by the OEM. Therefore (∂EΠFBSO )/(∂n) > (∂EΠ
FBO
O )/(∂n) and
the OEM’s optimal choice of n is larger in the FBS case than in FBO one. Figure 1
depicts the OEM’s profits in these two cases and provides an example where the optimal
choice of n is larger under FBS than under FBO for both high and low values of k.
Notice that while it is not clear whether expected profits are higher under FBS or FBO,
in general, the optimally chosen n is such that: nFBO < nFBS.
3.3 A Model of Trust
3.3.1 Definition of Trust
We have not yet discussed how trust enters in our setting. Assume that prior to the
investment choice, it is not certain which case will be relevant later on in the game.
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With probability λ it is the supplier who makes the take-it-or-leave-it offer in period 2
(FBS case), while with probability 1−λ it is the OEM who makes the offer (FBO case).
Hence with probability λ the supplier is able to capture a share of the surplus in excess
of his outside option.
How does this relate to what happens in the industry? In our interviews with indus-
try executives a clear picture emerged: The OEMs are at great liberty in designing and
enforcing contractual details in their relationship with suppliers, almost irrespective of
the size or market power of their counterparts.16 At first glance therefore it would appear
that only the FBO case described above (allotting the entire bargaining power to the
OEM) provides an accurate description of reality. This confrontational setting, in which
the relationship is defined mainly through the pure holdup-problem, is often subsumed
under the term of “American procurement strategy.”17 Yet traditionally, cooperative re-
lationships are prevalent in the Japanese automotive industry and were common practice
in Germany at least up until the mid-90s.18 In other words, it is possible to interpret λ
as a measure of the mutual trust relationship between the supplier and the OEM that
quantifies the share of the surplus in excess of the outside option, the OEM will leave
to the supplier in spite of having full bargaining power.
An alternative interpretation of λ could be generated by interpreting our game as the
stage game of an infinitely repeated game. If we restrict ourselves to Markov strategies
and think of λ as the state variable that summarizes the previous history of play, then
when the stage game we observe is played, λ is given and represents the players’ beliefs
that the FBS case will apply, that is the probability with which the OEM respects the
supplier’s property rights. This is the definition of trust we will use in the reminder
of the paper. Higher values of λ denote a higher belief that the OEM will grant the
supplier the full value of the surplus generated within the relationship (in excess of his
16See Mu¨ller, Stahl, and Wachtler (2008) for details. Ben-Shahar and White (2006) report equivalent
or even more dramatic findings for the North American automobile industry.
17Yet the global success of Japanese carmakers beginning in the 80s has prompted much interest in
alternative ways of supply-chain management, perhaps most famously incarnated in the MIT’s Interna-
tional Motor Vehicle Program. As a result, researchers started to stress the importance of cooperative
and mutually beneficial relationships between OEMs and suppliers in the industry in achieving the goals
of lean production. In this context, Taylor and Wiggins (1997) and in a more general setting Aghion,
Dewatripont, and Rey (2002) show that granting the suppliers positive rents can be a substitute for
control (i.e. monitoring quality levels and penalties).
18By then, an influential managagement personality, Ignacio Lopez, pushed for arms length contract-
ing, which upset the upstream relationship for some of the German OEMs. This is one important reason
for the observed variations in our data set that is key in explaining the relationships in question.
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outside option) — in other words, the higher λ, the more the supplier trusts that the
OEM will not exploit his superior market power that we are taking for granted.
We do not spell out here the infinitely repeated game. First, the data set on which
we base our empirical analysis is cross-sectional without a panel-dimension. Therefore,
what we observe can be considered exactly a one stage game, in which the current levels
of trust are exogenously given. Second, looking at this reduced form allows us to remain
agnostic about the reasons for the OEM wanting to grant the supplier a share of the
surplus. As in Taylor and Wiggins (1997) and Aghion, Dewatripont, and Rey (2002)
there could be a tradeoff between rent extraction and costs of control, or it may be worth
while to make the supplier fear the consequences of the relationship being terminated
as in Akerlof and Yellen (1990).
We can, therefore, summarize our definition of trust as follows: In a bilateral rela-
tionship affected by a hold-up problem, we consider trust as the belief by the party with
no bargaining power that its counterpart will not exploit its stronger bargaining position
by appropriating the whole surplus from the relationship.
3.3.2 Empirical Hypotheses
We are now ready to specify the two predictions of our analysis that we want to bring
to the data.
Hypothesis 1 Higher levels of supplier trust in the OEM are associated with higher
relationship specific investments by suppliers.
As seen in Subsection 3.2 above, this holds for any given procurement strategy chosen
by the OEM — but even this reduced form model conveys some of the complexity of the
procurement decision, which also depends on the level of quality uncertainty regarding
the product. Clearly, all else given, higher levels of quality uncertainty will induce
procurers to induce competition between more suppliers.
While we get a straightforward prediction as to the relationship between trust and
investment, the analysis regarding the level of competition induced by the OEM is more
complex and surprising. In a large part of the relational contracting literature, it is
argued that depending, for example, on the enforceability of complex clauses, competi-
tive arms-length agreements on the one hand and relational contracts on the other will
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be used in mutually exclusive settings. Supported by these findings one might expect,
3
n
Figure 2: OEM’s expected profits depending on n for different values of λ (Blue: 0.0;
red: 0.2; green: 0.4; brown: 0.6; orange: 0.8, cyan: 1.0).
at first blush, that supplier-OEM relationships governed by trust (with relatively high
λ) should be associated with less induced competition (lower n). Yet our model above
shows that generically the opposite is true, as λ simply generates a convex combination
between the two cases, in the FBS case a higher level of competition is optimally in-
duced. For the numerical example detailed in Table 1 above, Figure 2 displays how the
optimal n increases as λ increases from 0 to 1.
The intuition behind this result is as simple as it is striking. In the FBO setting,
the OEM extracts the supplier’s entire rent through his superior bargaining position,
exploiting the existing hold-up situation. In the FBS setting, he forgoes this opportunity.
Yet by inducing competition by a choice of a higher n he uses the endogenous outside
option, that does not directly affect the supplier’s investment incentives, to extract rent.
The result is that trust and competition are complements. Our second hypothesis from
the formal model is then:
Hypothesis 2 Higher levels of supplier trust in the OEM are associated with more
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intense supplier competition in the procurement process.
In what follows we bring both Hypotheses 1 and 2 to the data and test whether they
are reflected in what we observe in the German car manufacturers industry in recent
years.
4 Data and Descriptive Statistics
4.1 Data Source
Our data are the outcome of an online questionnaire study that we conducted under the
auspices of the VDA between Fall 2007 and Summer 2008. The questionnaire design was
based on the results of a pilot study performed in Spring 2007, in which we conducted
numerous interviews with high ranking executives in the industry.19 The questionnaire
data provide us with a unique view of the relationship between OEMs and their first-tier
suppliers. Each participating supplier was asked to evaluate its relationship with each
OEM it supplied for in Germany in clinical detail, separately for up to four products
representative for each of the four product classes (detailed below) of an established
industry classification. The questionnaire consisted of more than 300 questions covering
all central functions within the firms.20 The four product classes are:
Commodities: physically small and technologically unsophisticated (e.g. shock ab-
sorbers);
(High-tech) Components: physically small but technologically sophisticated (e.g. elec-
tronic sensor clusters);
Modules: physically large but technologically unsophisticated (e.g. front ends);
Systems: physically large and technologically sophisticated (e.g. break systems).
In total, more than 1,500 questionnaires were filled in by competent engineers, pro-
curement and sales officers. A participant first would have to indicate his function within
19For the qualitative results of this case study, see Mu¨ller, Stahl, and Wachtler (2008).
20In addition, the OEMs were asked to provide a general evaluation of their sourcing relationships
for each of the four different product classes.
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the company out of the following seven:21 pre-development (“basic” technological re-
search, not model-specific technological development), vehicle development (car-model
specific technology adaptation), series production, quality control, sales, logistics, after-
market. Finally, the participant was asked to choose a product for which he had the
necessary know-how, as well as the customers he worked with. For each product and
customer, he would then answer the set of questions suited to his function within the
company.
In our data set, we define one observation to be the set of answers to the entire
supplier questionnaire for a given product and customer. Potentially, therefore, multiple
individuals, working for the same supplier, provided answers to different parts of the
questionnaire. In order to obtain observations that covered as much of the questionnaire
as possible, we merged the answers received from a given supplier for a given product
class and customer over all functions to cover all aspects of the relationship.22 Each
observation describes one supplier view of the relationship with a given OEM for one
product representative for the technical class.23
4.2 Descriptive Statistics
With the underlying questionnaire we sought to depict complex relationships in hitherto
unmatched detail. Therefore, we first introduce (perhaps in more than usual detail) the
variables we focus on, in the hope to shed some light on the basic forces and tensions
that are at play between manufacturers and suppliers.
4.2.1 Participating Companies, Class Specification and Bargaining Power
On the OEM side, 10 of the 11 manufacturers producing in Germany participated in
the survey, 7 producers of passenger cars and 3 truck makers. Upstream 13 suppliers
active in the German market completed the survey on 11 OEMs (the 10 participating
21For a detailed description of the individual functions and the automobile development and produc-
tion process, we refer to Mu¨ller, Stahl, and Wachtler (2008). The characteristics of Pre-development,
Development and Series Production is discussed in Section 4.2.2.
22Whenever parts of questionnaires overlap, we use the arithmetic mean of the answers.
23We do have missing observations for two potential reasons: First, the questionnaire was not neces-
sarily completed for each product within each function of a company. Second, participants occasionally
skipped individual questions. Therefore the number of observations over questions differs, as reported
in the descriptive statistics below. In addition to this, not every supplier cooperates with every OEM
in the study.
20
car manufacturers plus one). The supplier sample is strongly biased towards large par-
ticipants, with average revenues in 2007 of 9.4 billion Euro (std 12.4). Even the smallest
participant posted revenues of more than 700 million Euro. This is reflected by the
self-reported European market shares for the individual products in our sample: This
was provided on a 5-point scale with an average of 3.76 (std 0.90), which translates into
a share of more than 25% of the European market. The correlation of market share with
the intensity of supplier competition — also on a 5-point scale — is negative with a value
of -0.20 (significant at 5%-level), and so is the correlation of supplier size (measured by
the 2007-revenues in billion Euros) with the perceived intensity of supplier competition
(-0.144, p-value 0.072). Finally, suppliers’ size and market share correlate positively
(0.124, p-value 0.083).
One might worry that the larger suppliers are able to exert monopoly power over
OEMs for some of the parts we study. As a result we might pick up the effects of
differentials in relative bargaining power instead of differentials in trust, as discussed
in the theoretical model above. Using data from a separate commercial database,24 we
verified that each product in our sample was produced by at least two firms active in
the German market. Further, we use proxies to control for relative market power in
our regressions, as this may clearly affect bargaining strength and the OEM’s outside
option, as described below.
The first proxy for relative bargaining power is the relative size of the companies,
therefore we include the 2007 revenues of suppliers in the regressions. The second set
of proxies is related to the product class or type specification introduced above, which
are strongly related to relationship specificity: Suppliers were asked to estimate the
R&D-share of total costs as well as assess the importance of the degree of innovation
for the particular part. Both items are measured on a 5-point scale — the importance
ranging from 1, “very little”, to 5, “very high” — while the R&D cost-shares were
provided in 2% increments — ranging from less than 2% to more than 8%. As one would
expect, the answers to the questions are strongly correlated (0.27, p-level below 0.1%).
More interestingly, though, this grants us a better understanding of the underlying type-
classification. Table 2 displays the descriptive statistics for these questions by underlying
product class.
Performing pairwise t-tests shows that the means for both variables are significantly
24“Who supplies whom” collected by supplierbusiness.com.
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Variable Mean (Std. Dev.) Min Max Obs
Systems
Cost Share R&D 4.19 (1.43) 1 5 37
Importance R&D 4.16 (.74) 1 5 50
Modules
Cost Share R&D 2.06 (1.76) 1 5 18
Importance R&D 2.89 (.76) 1 4 18
Components
Cost Share R&D 3.48 (1.40) 1 5 21
Importance R&D 3.42 (.87) 2 5 45
Commodities
Cost Share R&D 2.35 (1.35) 1 5 91
Importance R&D 2.91 (.69) 2 4 93
Table 2: Importance of Innovation and Cost share R&D by product type.
lower for commodities and modules than for systems and components, while among
these two groups the hypothesis of equal means cannot be rejected, which is in line
with the product class specification. To use as many of our observations as possible,
we capture the technological sophistication of a part (and, in a sense, the specificity
of the relationship) by introducing a dummy variable which takes the value 1 if the
part is a system or component. We also introduce a dummy taking the value 1 for
systems and modules, in order to account for potential price differences due to the sheer
size of the part. To account for potential system-specific effects, we also introduce the
interaction term between the two dummies.25 Finally, to capture remaining effects of
market structure, we include “customer fixed effects,” that is dummies for each of the
individual OEMs in the regressions.
4.2.2 Product Development Life-cycle and Supplier Competition
In our theoretical model, we depict two different stages in the development life-cycle of
a product: The development stage, in which suppliers invest to create a blueprint, and
the production phase, in which the surplus is generated and allocated. While clearly a
simplification, this structure is mirrored in our data. Indeed, we observe three distinct
phases in the product life-cycle: pre-development, development and series production.
Below, we briefly sketch these phases and describe how we use them in our empirical
25In what follows, in particular in the regression tables, these variables are labled “tech. soph.,” “size
of part” and “interaction,” respectively.
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approach.
In series production, suppliers work with existing blueprints and completely designed
(or existing) tools to produce the part in question. The product and services can be
clearly specified through contracts, determining in detail, for example, acceptable failure
rates and delivery conditions. None of this is possible in the model-specific development
phase. While the desired functionality of a part can be described, potentially highly
complex interfaces with other parts cannot be specified ex-ante. Blue-prints for the
part do not exist at the beginning of the design phase, indeed they are the outcome of
such a phase. The evolution of interfaces in the course of the part’s (and other parts’
simultaneous) design poses limitations to precise specifications in ex ante contracts;
this requires a continuous cooperative process. Pre-development covers R&D on new
technology, often purely based on the supplier’s initiative. By necessity, even if this
involves contracts, they cannot be clearly specified. For example, take the design of a
new brake-technology: Engineers may have no knowledge of how fast or heavy is the car
model, in which this breake-system will be implemented. Pre-development often involves
fundamental research, as a result it is even harder to write enforceable contracts on the
expected outcomes.26
How do the OEMs’ procurement decisions differ over the different development
phases? Parallel to the theoretical model, we asked how many competing suppliers
worked on the product in question within each of the design and production stages.
For this set of questions, the development stage was further subdivided into the four
subphases (starting with the earliest): product planning, product specification, con-
cept development and detailed development. Detailed development generates the final
blueprint — this is what we interpret as the investment period in our theoretical model.
For series production, we observe the number of suppliers at series start, after 1-2 years
and after more than 2 years.
For pre-development on average more than two (2.16) suppliers compete.27 This
number stays about constant in the first three stages of development, before it signif-
icantly decreases for the last development phase down to 1.51.28 It reaches its nadir
26Overall, it is to be expected that contracts in the earlier phases are less specific, and rely on
enforceability by repeated relationships, while contracts written in the production phase are more
specific and rely on enforceability by the courts. See Brown, Falk, and Fehr (2004) for experimental
evidence on a similar question.
27See Table 9 in the Appendix.
28See Table 10 in the Appendix.
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at the beginning of series production with 1.20, before it increases again to 1.59 two
years into production.29 How can we interpret these results? During pre-development,
the OEMs have multiple hand-picked suppliers work in parallel on the designs. The
most promising approach is brought into the development process. As the contractual
reimbursement for pre-development work is on average below 60% of the actual costs,
whether or not the company is awarded a subsequent development contract, there is a
strong incentive for suppliers to do everything possible for their preliminary design to be
selected. An analogous process is repeated again for the development process, resulting
in the specific blueprint. With this, the quality uncertainty is practically eliminated,
given that firms are generally certified through stringent quality assurance processes. In
production, fewer suppliers with higher volumes promise the highest economies of scales
and the steepest learning curves. In addition, obtaining a sole production contract is the
carrot waiving in front of the suppliers in the previous design and investment process.
Therefore the number of suppliers drops significantly at production start, in most cases
down to a sole producer. Once the learning curve effects have been realized, the OEM
can start to bring additional suppliers in.
These considerations are supported by a second set of observations. The respon-
dents were asked to specify how often different procurement strategies are employed
by the OEM for the product class in question in each of the different stages.30 For
pre-development, the options offered were preselection of a specific supplier and pro-
curement among a limited number of suppliers, each on a 6-point scale from 1 (never)
to 6 (very frequently). For development and series production, open procurement was
added as a further option. From the above, we would expect a shift from relational to
more arms-length contracting over the three phases and the results clearly support this
hypothesis.
For pre-development, OEMs are significantly more likely to contract with specific
suppliers (mean 4.43) than to go through a limited competitive procurement process
(mean 3.95, t-test for difference of means significant at 1% level).31 In contrast to this,
pre-selection of suppliers is significantly less likely both for development (mean 3.06)
29See Table 11 in the Appendix.
30Note that there is substantial variation in this measure as the pre-development, development and
production of parts are often procured separately. In addition, production is frequently procured anew
for each new series of a given model. There may be a new procurement process every 18 to 24 months,
and different strategies could be used at different points in time.
31See Table 9 in the Appendix.
and series production (mean 2.98).32 For development, the OEMs are significantly more
likely to procure among a limited number of suppliers (mean 5.18), so there is a clear shift
to more market-based interactions from pre-development to development.33 Similarly
from development to series production, where procurement among a limited number of
suppliers grows less important (mean 4.55), but there is a significant increase in the use
of open procurement (2.44 instead of 1.97).34
4.3 Measures of Trust
Trust is a sensitive concept which has proven to some degree elusive to attempts at
explanation and measurement by economists. Existing studies have mostly employed ei-
ther experimental/behavioral evidence, or subjects’ answers to variations on the question
“Can other people be trusted in general?” so the addressees of trust were not specified.
In contrast, our data has the advantage that it is relationship-specific. We ask repre-
sentatives of company A about their specific evaluation of the trust relationship with
company B with regard to the interactions concerning a type of product in three ways,
each with a slightly different emphasis:
1) What is the importance of trust for your firm’s decision to initialise a pre-development
with the OEM?
2) How do you evalute mutual trust between OEM and supplier with respect to hon-
oring each others intellectual property rights?
3) Please evaluate the importance of mutual trust between the supplier and OEM for
the OEM’s supplier selection (respectively for each of the 3 product developments
stages)
In a separate appendix,35 we show in detail that the resulting measures are strongly
positively correlated with each-other, as well as by which measures of OEM behavior,
such as aggressive price re-negotiations, they are affected. In addition, we perform a
factor analysis to demonstrate that significant shares of the variation in the measures
32See Tables 10 and 11 in the Appendix, respectively.
33See Table 10 in the Appendix.
34See Tables 10 and 11 in the Appendix.
35Available at: Trust Appendix.
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can be explained by a single underlying factor. In the analysis below we use the third
measure, in our view the most consistent of these measures both in terms of the phrasing
of the question as well as the results of the factor analysis.
For these questions, suppliers were asked to evaluate the OEM’s supplier choice
criteria on a six-point scale from 1 (no relevance) to 6 (very important), for each of
the phases in the product life-cycle. In the immediate context, they were also asked to
evaluate the importance of price on the same scale. To counter idiosyncratic answers, we
normalize the trust answers by taking differences between the importance of trust and
price. To make use of as much available information as possible, we use the arithmetic
mean of the normalized answers over the three product development stages as our trust
measure, which has a mean of -.646, a minimum of -4, a maximum of 2.33 and a standard
deviation of 1.02, with 229 observations.36
5 Empirical Analysis
In this section, we directly test the two hypotheses generated in the theoretical section
using this trust measure. Each question is related to central aspects of the buyer-supplier
relationships: First we study how trust is related to relationship specific investment,
and then we consider the correlation between trust and the level of supplier competition
induced by the OEM (measured by the number of competing suppliers).
There is one important caveat. Due to the cross-sectional structure of our data
set, determining the direction of causality is an issue. One can make the argument
that higher investment by suppliers leads to higher levels of trust in the OEM: Less
investment may lead to more conflicts between the parties, which in turn deteriorates
trust. Alternatively, one can argue the reverse causality in our second hypothesis: An
improved trust relationship leads the OEM to induce more competition in procurement.
The latter argument is perhaps less convincing. In any case, in the following we refer to
correlation between trust and competition rather than causality.
36We also performed the regressions below with the individual measures. The results are qualitatively
the same, though the significance levels vary, mainly due to smaller numbers of observations. Using a
non-normalized measure also does not significantly alter results.
5.1 Trust and Investment
Hypothesis 1 from our model states that higher levels of trust should be associated with
more relationship specific investment by suppliers. Measuring supplier investment poses
a serious challenge. As we do not observe product-specific investment directly,37 we
apply proxies based on the quality of parts. It is a standard interpretation of quality
related effort in the literature that supplier investment directly affects the failure rates
of parts (see, for example, Taylor and Wiggins (1997)).
Along these lines, respondents were asked: With respect to the part considered, how
often do quality problems occur?, measured on a 5-point scale, with 1 identifying the
lowest and 5 the highest frequency. We create a dummy variable which takes the value
1 only if no quality problems occur, that is a 1 was reported for the quality question.
In general, severe difficulties would arise when trying to assess under-investment-related
quality issues empirically, as a) the observed failure rates of cars cannot necessarily be
linked to individual parts, b) the diligence of the manufacturer in assembly also affects
quality and c) if quality problems are diagnosed and solved before the parts are in-
stalled, this is generally not observable. The huge advantage of our questionnaire is that
the responses are part-specific, which addresses issue a). The phrasing of the question
addresses issue c), as it was meant to include all of the development and production
phases involving the part in question. By including customer- or OEM-effects in the
regressions, we address issue b).38
We choose the following Probit specification, with yij denoting the probability that
no quality problems arise with part i at OEM j, κ a constant, α the customer fixed-effect,
and Z representing the control variables (dummies for the technological sophistication
and size of the part, the interaction term, and the supplier revenues in 2007):39
yij = κ+ αj + β ∗ trustij + γ ∗ Zi + ǫij (10)
Our hypothesis predicts a positive coefficient for β. We estimated the model with
37In our qualitative interviews, the suppliers stated that even they themselves have difficulties in
specifying the development costs or the capital outlay for the production of a particular part.
38A potential drawback is the fact that the frequencies are self-reported, so that respondents may be
tempted to under-report problems. To counter this, complete anonymity was guaranteed at the outset
of the study.
39To address the original question, we also perform ordered-Probit regressions, the results can be
found in the same Table 3. Notice that due to the phrasing in the definition of the dummy, the effects
in these regressions move in opposing directions.
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and without customer dummies. The results of the regressions can be found in the
following Table 3.40
Variables Probit results♠ Ordered-Probit results♥
trust index .083* .135** -.151 -.271**
(.054) (.012) (.126) (.026)
tech. soph. -.096 -.135 .267 .468*
(.381) (.235) (.161) (.091)
size of part -.203* -.213* 1.061*** 1.072***
(.089) (.079) (.000) (.001)
interaction .012 .052 -.698 -.794*
(.937) (.752) (.108) (.076)
supplier revenues -.001 .002 -.007 -.006
(.873) (.690) (.406) (.485)
cut1 .262 .141
(std. err.) (.232) (.360)
cut2 1.962 1.901
(std. err.) (.278) (.387)
cut3 2.294 2.245
(std. err.) (.302) (.404)
cut4 2.745 2.710
(std. err.) (.356) (.448)
OEM-FE no yes no yes
# obs. 138 138 138 138
Ps-R2 .065 .103 .065 .092
♠ probability of not observing quality problems, average marginal effects and (p-values) reported; ♥ frequency of quality
problems arising, coefficients and (p-values) reported; * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
Table 3: Trust and Investment: Probit and Ordered-Probit regression results
Consider the results of the Probit estimation first: The coefficients of the trust vari-
able are indeed significantly positive, that is higher levels of supplier trust are associated
with less frequent quality issues. The size of the coefficients is definitely relevant from
an economic perspective. Increasing trust by one standard deviation coincides with a
decrease in the probability of quality problems by more than 8%, if one disregards the
identity of the customer. If one controls for the identity customer (OEM dummies)
then there is an even stronger effect that corresponds to more than 13% difference. The
difference between the two values is in itself interesting. One explanation is that the
40We analogously observe assessments of the frequency of product related recalls. Performing the
same exercise for these yields qualitatively identical results.
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OEM undertakes a complementary investment, in its absence both the supplier’s trust
and the quality of parts may decrease. In other words, the effect of trust on quality
(via the suppliers’ investment) is underestimated. In the ordered-Probit regressions, we
find the same qualitative picture. Here, in the absence of customer fixed effects trust is
not significantly correlated with investment, while controlling for customer fixed effects
we obtain a strong and significant relationship with the expected sign. It is less sur-
prising that composite/large parts are 20% more likely to generate quality/investment
problems.
Overall, we conclude that the evidence from the results supports our first hypothesis:
As far as investment can be measured by the (inverse) frequency of quality problems,
higher levels of trust are associated with higher levels of investment by the supplier.
5.2 Trust and Competition
Our second central hypothesis is that higher levels of trust should be associated with
more competition induced by the OEM. The supplier faces attempts at rent extraction
by the OEM either through the exploitation of the hold-up situation, or through com-
petition at the investment stage. More competition may then be associated with higher
levels of compliance to property rights by the party with the superior bargaining power,
and therefore higher levels of trust.
In view of the structure of our data, our model predicts a specific pattern: A positive
association of trust and competition in the development phase, in which the supplier
undertakes the relationship specific investment. The forces that drive this positive rela-
tionship are not in place in the pre-development (this phase is supplier specific but not
model specific), or in series production (in this phase the tools used by the supplier are
typically owned by the OEM). In line with our model, therefore, we would expect as
an additional test of the theory a significantly weaker relationship in these phases. No-
tice that the extant literature on relational contracts literature would predict a negative
relationship between competition and trust.
Our empirical test is therefore to analyze how supplier competition in the different
stages of production — measured by the number of parallel suppliers involved in the
pre-development, development and production of the specific model, respectively — are
associated with our trust measure. In the basic specifications we use OLS as we are
mainly interested in the correlations between the variables. Taking the structure of our
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data into account, since significant shares of the observations are at the lower limit of
1 supplier we also perform Tobit regressions. In the following specification yij is the
number of suppliers employed by customer (OEM) j for part i, κ a constant, x is the
trust measure and Z the vector of control variables discussed before.
yij = κ+ β ∗ xij + γ ∗ Zi + ǫij (11)
According to our second hypothesis we would expect a positive sign for β in the
specification for development. Higher levels of trust should be associated with a higher
incentive to extract rents by means of more competition, that is employing more parallel
suppliers.
Variables Pre-development♠ Development♠ Series Production♠
trust index -.096 .171** .055
(.325) (.037) (.141)
tech. soph. .083 -.408** -.317***
(.660) (.016) (.000)
size of part -.065 -.362* -.401***
(.872) (.077) (.000)
interaction .243 .089 .358***
(.585) (.757) (.000)
supplier revenues .002 .009 -.000
(.695) (.117) (.868)
constant 1.757 1.880 1.393
(.000) (.000) (.000)
OEM-FE yes yes yes
# obs. 100 139 174
Adj. R2 .040 .107 .138
♠ (p-values) reported; * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
Table 4: Trust and Competition: OLS-regression results
The results of the OLS (Table 4) and the Tobit (Table 5) regressions are qualitatively
identical. Most importantly, the trust measure is positively and strongly (at the 5%
level) significant for the development stage only. The coefficient for pre-development is
negative and not significant (p-value of around .3 for both specifications), the coefficient
for the series-production phase is positive, but also not significantly so (p-values of .14
and .22, respectively). This not withstanding, its size is substantially smaller than the
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Variables Pre-development♠ Development♠ Series Production♠
trust index -.107 .337** .227
(.291) (.050) (.220)
tech. soph. .081 -.969*** -1.386***
(.682) (.005) (.001)
size of part -.101 -1.072** -2.194***
(.811) (.014) (.001)
interaction .324 .012 1.586*
(.487) (.958) (.072)
supplier revenues .002 .022* -.008
(.734) (.061) (.610)
constant 1.685 1.835 .621
(.000) (.000) (.323)
OEM-FE yes yes yes
# obs. 100 139 174
# cens. obs 13 80 144
Pseudo R2 .076 .137 .213
♠ (p-values) reported; * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
Table 5: Trust and Competition: Tobit-regression results (lower bound = 1)
one of the development phase. The coefficient of trust for the development phase, .171,
can readily be interpreted relative to the average number of suppliers employed during
this stage, which is 1.51. Therefore, raising the trust measure by one standard deviation
is associated with an increase of the number of suppliers competing of more than 10%
of the average level. We take this to be strong support for our second hypothesis.
Considering the results in the other stages sheds further light on the issue and corrob-
orates our characterization of the different phases. Noticeably, for the pre-development
phase, none of the controls, including the size and sophistication of the part play a signifi-
cant role. This reflects the observation that the non-model-specific fundamental research
involved at this stage follows a different set of rules. It is often initiated purely by the
upstream suppliers, and when it is not, the greater uncertainty involved in the project
gives an additional incentive to involve more firms. On the other hand, the pattern
of the other coefficients for series-production is very similar to the development stage.
Further down the line in the product development life-cycle, as it becomes progressively
easier to specify contractual details and product characteristics, the procurement phases
are more easily comparable. One distinguishing feature between the development phase
and series production though remains. Once the blueprints exist, the need for relation-
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ship specific investment by the supplier is substantially reduced. This is reflected in
the difference in the importance of trust for the production procurement decisions and
provides further support for our second hypothesis.
6 Concluding Remarks
Trust is an important ingredient in almost all meaningful social and economic interac-
tions. While, largely due to availability of data, most empirical research on trust has
focused on the willingness of individuals to trust others in general. We are here able
to shed light on the role of trust as fostered or squandered in pairwise economic rela-
tionships. We first propose and model an intuitive definition for trust: In a bilateral
relationship involving a hold-up situation, we define trust the belief by the party with
the weaker bargaining power, that its counterpart will not exploit its stronger bargaining
position by appropriating the whole surplus from the relationship.
We are then able to document how an OEM’s investment in supplier trust, charac-
terized by the OEM decision to forgo (often short-term) opportunities of appropriating
rent, can pay off. Contractual relationships characterized by higher levels of trust are
associated with significantly higher investment by suppliers, resulting in fewer failures
and callbacks on the parts supplied.
More surprisingly, we also show that higher levels of trust by suppliers are associated
with the downstream procurer’s decision to have a larger number of upstream suppliers
compete for the development, or production contract. In other words, more intense
upstream competition is a substitute for the buyer’s decision to exploit an existing
hold-up situation. Indeed, the OEM that does not extract surplus using its superior
bargaining power can appropriate a larger share of the surplus by increasing competition
among suppliers and in this way enhancing its (endogenously determined) outside option
without affecting the suppliers’ incentives to invest.
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Appendix: Descriptive Statistics
Variable Mean (Std. Dev.) Min Max Obs.
When is supplier asked to participate? 2.77 (1.37) 1 6 144
How often is progress coordinated? 2.98 (.57) 1 5 151
Share of efforts absorbed by supplier 3.50 (1.33) 1 5 142
Cost reimbursement if subsequent contract 2.31 (1.52) 1 5 246
Cost reimbursement if no subsequent contract 2.39 (1.59) 1 5 232
Specificity development objectives wrt...
... content 2.33 (.97) 1 5 350
... time-frame 1.85 (.96) 1 5 350
... financial engagement 2.22 (1.14) 1 5 343
OEM’s supplier choice criteria:
... importance of supplier price 5.10 (1.16) 1 6 158
... importance of duration cooperation 4.70 (.99) 1 6 160
... importance of trust 4.89 (.98) 1 6 159
Table 6: Relationship Characteristics: Pre-Development (Suppliers’ view)
Variable Mean (Std. Dev.) Min Max Obs.
How specific and detailed are specifications? 2.39 (1.02) 1 5 231
Supplier’s degree of freedom 2.91 (.86) 1 5 231
Desired degree of freedom 3.62 (.77) 1 5 229
OEM’s contribution to development 2.37 (1.10) 1 5 200
Frequency of IPR conflicts 2.24 (.87) 1 5 194
OEM’s supplier choice criteria:
... importance of supplier price 5.37 (.72) 2.5 6 387
... importance of duration cooperation 4.52 (1.00) 1 6 387
... importance of personal contact 4.52 (.98) 1 6 387
... importance of certification 4.39 (1.14) 1 6 377
... importance of trust 4.90 (.93) 1 6 384
Table 7: Relationship Characteristics: Development (Suppliers’ view)
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Variable Mean (Std. Dev.) Min Max Obs.
How often does OEM produce part himself? 1.69 (1.31) 1 6 210
OEM’s supplier choice criteria:
... importance of supplier price 5.70 (.52) 3 6 253
... importance of duration cooperation 4.38 (1.07) 1 6 253
... importance of personal contact 4.44 (1.10) 1 6 253
... importance of certification 4.28 (1.19) 1 6 250
... importance of trust 4.73 (.98) 1 6 252
Table 8: Relationship Characteristics: Series Production (Suppliers’ view)
Variable Mean (Std. Dev.) Min Max Obs.
Number of competing suppliers 2.16 (.84) 1 5 137
Frequency of subsequent development projects 3.23 (1.11) 1 5 322
How often were projects discontinued in last 5 yrs. 2.00 (.88) 1 5 139
How often were the following employed...
... preselection of a specific supplier 4.43 (1.26) 1 6 351
... procurement among a ltd. number of suppliers 3.95 (1.44) 1 6 338
Table 9: Procurement Decisions: Pre-Development (Suppliers’ view)
Variable Mean (Std. Dev.) Min Max Obs.
Frequency joint procurement dev. and production 3.76 (1.24) 1 5 363
Number of suppliers employed during...
... product planning 2.22 (1.13) 1 5 167
... product specification 2.03 (1.02) 1 5 177
... concept development 2.12 (1.07) 1 5 208
... detailed development 1.51 (0.90) 1 5 210
How often were the following employed...
... preselection of a specific supplier 3.06 (1.52) 1 6 259
... procurement among a ltd. number of suppliers 5.18 (1.10) 1 6 264
... open procurement 1.97 (1.41) 1 6 255
Table 10: Procurement Decisions: Development (Suppliers’ view)
34
Variable Mean (Std. Dev.) Min Max Obs.
Number of suppliers employed...
... at production start 1.20 (.58) 1 5 251
... after 1-2 years 1.47 (.78) 1 5 249
... after more than 2 years 1.59 (.81) 1 5 246
How often were the following employed...
... preselection of a specific supplier 2.98 (1.63) 1 6 248
... procurement among a ltd. number of suppliers 4.55 (1.52) 1 6 248
... open procurement 2.44 (1.66) 1 6 243
Table 11: Procurement Decisions: Series Production (Suppliers’ view)
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